Category Archives: economics

Disintermediation: the landlord

Here’s an amusing thought.  Quoted over at calculated risk: “We’ve attracted a lot of borrowers who are really renters  It is disheartening as a servicer to see the willingness [to walk away]  [borrowers] simply don’t care.”

Ha!  The bankers have disintermediated the landlord; and like usual when you cut out a middleman you discover, a while later that he had a function which surprise surprise you now have to fill.  And since you haven’t been filling that role well to date there are more surprises to come.  No doubt there is a business opportunity there; a variant of the condo management companies, but this time beholding to the bank rather than the condo board.

Holding the Bag

The Irish decided to impose a 33 cents tax on those plastic bags that retailers use. I presume this was in part a sin tax, in part an attempt to tax the externalities created by the bags, and in part a bit of stunt. The end of the story is that it’s wiped out the use of plastic bags, shifted social norms about bag usage. It’s a fascinating story about deciding to change the way a society behaves; making it acceptable to shun those who exercise their freedom to use plastic bags.

For some reason that story is currently slotted in my mind with the health care debate’s latest point of discussion.

The question at hand is should we put everybody into the system, or should we allow people to opt out. Allowing people to opt out would presumably create incentives for people to game the system. Or putting it another way it would allow people to gamble that they aren’t going to need health care during the next time interval.

Boffins think that this single choice would have a sharp effect on costs. Plans were we all join look likely to cost us each about $2,700 a year, while those were we allow gaming would cost $4,400 per year. Intuitively that sounds about right – you just take a guess on how many people would decide to take a swag at getting away with no healthcare, say 25%, and then you figure that group is likely to be somewhat less likely to need care, say 60% less; an you get similar numbers.

So that’s 63% more expensive or additional $147/month. Our faux progressive funding system pushes most of the cost of these social programs onto the middle and upper middle class so you can multiply that as you think is appropriate. But that class struggle is less interesting to me today.
What this highlights is how it creates two classes: those who decide they want to take the gamble, in one class, are costing everybody who decides to join, the second class. It is an interesting case of creating a clear cost to the majority group by allowing a minority a freedom. The boffins think that minority is pretty large. Will those who join will shun those who take the gamble? Will the system create shifting social norms, like the Irish experience with the bags, where it becomes unacceptable behavior to take that gamble?
There is another interesting take though. An intertemporal one. I presume that many of those who might decide to take that bet they won’t get sick will be young people. There are plenty of reasons to think that. Young people tend to be less able to afford the insurance. They tend to be less risk adverse. They tend to be healthier. They tend to have less common cause with large institutions. Over time a person is two people; a young person, and then latter a older person. The first of these is raising the costs of the second one.

Actually there are really three people or more people in each individual, since for example, what makes for a healthy young person is a healthy childhood. So the healthy young person that opts out has his head in a bag, selectively blind to both to the past and the future.

Esty – two kinds of entrepeurship

For about the last six months I’ve been observing etsy.com with some interest. To first order it is a classic two sided hub, so naturally I’d be interested.  A market place in this case.  It aggregates a large number of small sellers of handmade goods and their buyers. Providing shops, search/browsing, transaction orchestration.

As a business they are not built to flip, but rather to last.  That is always risky and thus more respectable. Over all they are a rough but solid operation.  It’s no wonder that they have attracted some very high quality folks as advisors/investors/coders.

For me the most interesting aspect of esty might be called their branding.  But boy that is far too bloodless.  Worse, it leads to a misunderstanding. Etsy is entrepreneurial in two or more ways. They are building a business. One that can turn out to be a quite significant retailing hub.  Thus, they are classic business entrepreneurs with all that implies; much of which is unfortunate.

Success in creating that hub would be significant.  As a rule internet hubs aren’t good for small enterprise.    I am conflicted about that conclusion, but there it is.  Generally the internet has accelerated the hollowing out of small business.  The Internet’s power to create major intermediaries and thus break and thin out the connections between producers and consumers ain’t a healthy development for us all.

I’ve written before about my hypothesis about how to help counter that. You need to create more connections horizontally between parties. Which I call small group forming. These are hard to create in scalable ways.  But  when created they shift social and economic flows downward on the distribution of wealth rather than upward.

So should Esty succeed in doing what, say OSCommerce has failed to do, it can create a bloom of vibrant small business activity inside of the Internet.  That, in turn, it would help shift the curve. That could be a real help tempering rather than worsening the distribution of wealth.

Which brings us to the second kind of entrepreneurship that Esty is trying to execute on. It is a kind of social entrepreneurial activity. An effort to change the nature of the economy. You can hear that in some of their communication. For example talking about creating a more adaptable or robust economy is one sign of that.

This two for one kind of entrepreneurial activity is hard to execute on. There are powerful systemic forces in play that tend to hand the power to economic rather than the social side of the balancing act. There is a wide spread presumption (a fair one!) that firms talking about the social side of the game are only playing a branding game. That they are the capitalist version of a corrupt politician who uses populist rhetoric.

But, Etsy is taking a interesting swing at the problem. Surprisingly practical. For example if you look at the list of things that make businesses resistant to consolidation (franchising, chain store, mail order, etc) the Esty target market (handmade goods) is a good choice. For example their efforts to encourage their sellers to engage in local organizing is another sign of taking seriously the puzzle of how to strength, rather than suck the life out of local and small business.

Self Trading

When hanging out in the world of ideas created by Ainsle’s work Emerson’s cliche “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.” offers a nice perspective. Possibly Emerson’s point was that given a larger mind you can house yet more than one hobgoblin.

In related news I see that when they cleaned up the data from Google prediction market they discarded some trades, including “self-trades (which resulted from the fact that the software allowed traders to be matched with their own limit orders).” I wonder how much of that goes on in real markets. It’s clearly a sign of the temporal inconsistency which Ainsle’s work focuses on.

These trades took place between the hobgoblin that decided to place a limit order, and a later hobgoblin that decided to make a trade at that moment. It isn’t clear to me exactly why it’s best practice to remove the trades between these hobgoblins just because they were housed in the same person’s corporal body.

There is a wonderful classic poem, Goblin Market, here’s a bit of one of the many beautiful illustrations it’s engendered over the years. In this scene the heroine, after attempting to act as a middleman, has drawn down upon her the rage of the merchants.
goblinmarket.png.

Good news on solar power?

Some years ago this chart from the DOE convinced me that solar power was in trouble; that 4-5$/watt was about as good as it gets.  Bad news, given that coal is substantially cheaper than than.  It was beyond my wit to know what the source of this problem is.  It might be market forces – that the floor looks like it was hit just about the time the pulse of money generated by the 70’s oil crises is thought provoking.  It might be a technology limit of some kind, something in the physics say.

In any case it appears there is good news.  Because these folks are claiming they will hit a dollar a watt soon.  “we believe will make us the first solar manufacturer capable of profitably selling solar panels at as little as $.99/Watt.”  That’s the future tense, and it doesn’t include the rest of the capital equipment involved in the installation.    Good news none the less.

It’s weird that they are shipping them to East Germany; you’d think they would prefer someplace sunny.

DTR

I think I’ve found the most evil journal in the university library. The Journal of Consumer Research is marketing’s DARPA, the place where new weapons in are developed for sales and marketing. There are plenty of self help airplane books for salesmen, like Sales Closing for Dummies, or Sig Ziglar’s Secrets of Closing the Sale. What you get over in the Journal of Consumer Research is guys in white coats throwing around psychology jargon like mad scientists. For example: “Disruption should impede closure and motivate consumers high in NFCC to seek clarifying information that facilitates the ablity to reach closure quickly.”

The article that drew me in was on a little trick of the trade known as DTR, or Disrupt and Reframe. This gimmick works by first confusing the buyer and then re framing it to be less confusing. For example:

“The price of these note cards is 300 pennies.” This disruption was followed by the reframing: “That’s $3. It’s a bargain.” .. compliance rates ranged from 65% to 90% … compared to only 25% to 50% …”

While I love the use of the word “compliance” the take away is that 2-3 times more junk get’s sold if you bewilder your customers.

That mnemonic above NFCC refers to a trait known as need for cognitive closure. People with very high or very low NFCC are a bit rash. Folks with very high NFCC will rush to pin an explanation to a mystery; and then cling tightly to it going forward. Folks with very low NFCC leave everything open to further assessment.

It is but one of a slew of traits that psychologists have tests to measure, IQ probably being the most famous. The traits give rise to metrics, and the metrics can then be used to forecast patterns of behavior. It’s usually less accurate than predicting the weather with a barometer, but certainly more accurate than throwing dice. Puzzling out new metrics like this is one of the ways the field of psychology moves forward. It’s good if the metrics are independent much the way wind and temperature are better than wind and wind-chill. So it is standard practice to see if metric A is correlated with metric B. For example NFCC is not highly correlated with intelligence.

The psychologist, not a marketing guy, that invented NFCC has two other metrics that I found thought provoking. He points out that when solving a problem you can assess your options or you can get down to work. Presumably for a high stakes problem you’d be well advised do lots of both, but he suspects that people don’t. So he sought out a metric that would score people’s tendency to assess; and a second metric that would score their tendency to act.

One of the reasons that DTR works is that it exhausts the buyer’s willingness to assess the purchases, and that helps to move him into the acting phase.

To me the interesting thing about all this is that is suggests that many other persuasion techniques might be better framed into these terms. For example the usual explanation for why vendors like prices like $1.97 is that innumerate buyers think ‘Ah, a dollar” rather than “Ah, two dollars,” discussed here (pdf). I, now, think that’s wrong. The functional purpose of that pricing technique is to inflict a DTR attack on the buyer.

Expensive Eccentric

Markets are the friend of the plutocracy. In the market the votes are per dollar rather than per person. Which is, in passing, one reason why “market choice” isn’t synonymous with democratic freedom. Progressive governments do assorted things to counter the pro-plutocracy tendency of markets, for example creating public goods that raise the foundation the entire economy stands upon, but that’s not what this post is about.

Tibor Scitovskyin his book “The Joyless Economy” points out that mass production can act as a countervailing force. Mass production, which can lower unit costs tremendously and that empowers the masses to draw out of the economy goods which raise their standard of living and fulfill their desires. The market aggregates their dollars and mass production leverages those dollars. These pseudo public goods are leveraged by both rich and poor.

This arguement is analogous to the change the subject argument made whenever the distribution of wealth becomes the subject of attention; e.g. that rising standards of living have raised all boats. I don’t have much patience with those arguments, but that’s not what this post is about.

Economies of scale create a well known perverse effect; they tend to make the largest producer in an industry the cost, quality, and profit leader. That’s is good for the plutocracy and bad for the health of the market. What Scitovskyin highlights is a perverse effect on the consumer side.

Scitovskyin uses an older term for the consumer, he calls them the mob. The mob is the complement of the plutocracy. The mob can only benefit from economies of scale if a coherent demand signal emerges in the market about their desires. In the absence of that signal the producers don’t know what to make. That creates a yearning for both producers and consumers to rendezvous, standardize, on achievable desires.

It is perverse that mass production creates incentives for everybody to be more conventional. Advertisers pour money into the market is their yearning to accelerated the forming of this or that consensus. It’s parsimonious to argue that when they succeed it’s their desires, rather than the mob who’s desires really being fulfilled. One is tempted at this point to call them the herd. In any case, economies of scale act encourage normative of behavior in the mob.

Markets make it expensive to be eccentric. What ever goods and services the eccentric desires are substantially less likely to be produced by the market. Of course if your rich you can bear that expense. If your poor these market forces pressure you to extinguish your abnormal desires. There is a long tradition of plutocrats fearing the mob, see French revolution. Early propagandists felt it was in their brief to help keep the mob in line. It probably says something about American education that I’d not previously noticed that the market works to normalize the mob’s behaviors.

It is amusing to note that the rich, while probably not born more or less abnormal than the rest of us, are less likely to have their rough edges worn off.

But there is another point I want to draw out here. As I’ve only just begun this book I don’t know if he goes onto make it. The economies of scale also work to extinguish some goods and services. Mass production is not a universal solution. It is not effective across all goods and services. It works well for something thing, e.g. lawn furniture, but much less well for others, e.g. live music.

So a second perversity of markets is that they work to extinguish goods and services that are resistant to scaling and this happens even if there is substantial demand for them. Thought provokingly, by the force of habit the market will label those activities as eccentric; and when members of the mob signal their demand for them they the market’s return signal will be “mind your manners.”

Money supply

Brad Delong write “Central Banking in Practice

So, today the monetary base in the North Atlantic economies is 7% higher than it was yesterday–an annualized growth rate  of 2100% per year

This is indeed a significant liquidity event…

I.e. central banks increased the money supply, presumably some gears needed lubricating.  It makes the mind boggle.

Wegman’s

One of the institutions of upstate New York is Wegman’s, here in Ithaca the Wegman’s is a vast box store; i.e. the size of a Walmart or a Target.  It makes you wish you had a bicycle.  Like other modern grocery retailing machines they try to lock you in with a loyality card.  I have a small collection of these for the stores around Boston, all in Mr. Gate’s name, so you can imagine my disappointment that Wegman’s actually requires you to show your driver’s license before they issue one.

Reading as I am regional histories has brought to my attention that the US suffered a major economic Panic in 1837.  One event in that unfolding mess was the point when banks, which at the time issued most of the folding money, all stopped exchanging it for hard currency.      “Out of 850 banks in the United States, 343 closed entirely, sixty-two failed partially, and the system of State banks received a shock from which it never fully recovered.”  The customers of those banks and the holders of their currency lost everything.  They were locked-in, what a marketing person would call loyal.  How money should work became a key issue in the national debate for a long period following.  Over time the US moved from a highly distributed currency system to a centralized one.  I believe we are moving back to something more privately run.  The loyalty cards only a small part of that.
Once in possession of your Wegman’s loyalty card the check out transaction process has three steps.  First you prove you are a loyal members of the Wegman’s club by swiping your card.  At that point you are presented with a screen with, and this is the amazing part, 8 choices on it!  These distinguish which currency system you want to use.  Having selected, for example credit, you then swipe a second card to reveal what credit card network your allied with.  There is a fourth step where you sign the receipt; but this is optional based on rules I haven’t investigated.

The reason for all these currency systems is to allow thier operators to take slice of every transaction.  The slices are huge, many percent.  A huge operator like Wegman’s probably has the slice negotated down; but a small retailer, like the coop in Ithaca (who also has a loyality program), is probably paying 5-7% across all his transactions.  Meanwhile I got a 2$ off the price of a pie.

Of course the faux reason for these systems is efficiency.    Here’s a lovely blog posting about that!, where in the writer attempts to fight back because he’s so peeved by the Visa Ad campaign intended to shame people who aren’t getting with the program.

As an interesting complement to all this the Ithaca community has a long running experiment in trying to run it’s own currency system.  I presume they are called Ithaca Hours to link them to work rather than gold.  In the period following the Panic of 1837 many companies started paying their workers in scrip.  I love the idea of local currencies, but I must admit I can’t quite puzzle out if they are a good or a bad witch.  I am confident that the entire credit card/debit-card system ought to be run by the US treasury; the cost of running these alternate currency systems is outrageous.