Archive for October, 2004

Mind in the Gutter

Sunday, October 31st, 2004

I once referred to it as the margin. Then for a while I called it the sidebar. Today? I call it the gutter. (reader: “What you talking about Ben?”) That area on the edges of webpages where folks pile up navigation, advertising, and other what nots.

My favorite bit of gutter trash has been my little link blog, based off of one of my categories in delicious.

Notice! New gutter trash.

The coolest new bit of trash is a tiny map of the world with dots all over it showing an estimate of where my readers dropped in from. It’s a way down toward the bottom. Too cool!

I just added some advertising for ApacheCon. ApacheCon is a delightful conference for real engineers who actually build stuff (example). None of that enterprise sales cruft; just real people who like to hack up solutions to problems. Good bunch of people! A great place to learn what new tools people are actually using versus who’s buying a lot of advertising.

The group of folks in Apache who organize this event do a great job. They are careful to keep the costs down. Las Vegas is cheap to fly to. The hotel is nice, affordable, and free of those damn machines that keep demanding that you pay attention to them and feed them money.

Register today, you won’t be sorry.

Internets!

Friday, October 29th, 2004

Last time around the right wing treated us all to a concerted campaign to pretend that Al Gore had falsely claimed to have invented the Internet.

I presume it was nostalgia for those good old days that lead President Bush to invent the whole new and improved internets. As usual the Whitehouse made a valiant effort to prove there the existence of many Internet (or is it Interneti); even leaking top secret information to make their case.

But wait! There’s more! INTERNETS VETERANS FOR TRUTH.

Expensive Number Registries

Wednesday, October 27th, 2004

I think I’m currently in the lead; so let the games begin. What numbers are the most expensive? The UCC firm prefix is around $150/year and about $750 get into the game. Martin Geddes takes a stab at the value of a phone number treating it as a license to bill customers he get’s a valuation of around $140 dollar a year.

I’ve become increasingly interested in the number business; i.e. selling minted registered official numbers. The raw material is free and plentiful. It is almost the canonical example of the commons. But as the examples above make clear, registered numbers are can be quite expensive. The act of converting a common number into private property is the business of a registry. The domain over which the numbers are used form a club, the registry plays a role in the regulation or governance of that club. That registry can be a private rent seeking entity, like Verisign, or a nonprofit that seeks less naively quantifiable goals like the UCC or ICANN.

Frame it how ever you like, there is always an owner (or owners) of the registry function. A bit of paranoia about these registries is in order. On the one hand they are well positioned to become abusive monopolies (or oligarchies) , while on the other they can suffer all the classic breakdowns that trouble commons.

The rent seeking registry owner strives to make the numbers scarce. To convince customers that common numbers are worth something are better than common numbers is a bit of a magic trick. The trick is one of illusion, faith, and fact.

Consider the prime numbers needed to implement https connections; i.e. SSL keys. How much of the value of a SSL key from a leading vendor is illusion, faith, or fact?

What concerns me is the lack of awareness among system designers of the choices they are making when they block out the design of these registries. Some design choices favor the emergence of a highly concentrated registrar market while others favor the emergence of a dysfunctional diffuse set of registrars. While either outcome has unfortunate side effects it appears to me that most designers aren’t even aware they are making these choices.

Consider an example - domain name registries. Rent seeking is common. Long tedious efforts by members of the club to reduce the degree of market concentration continue. I have been amused to notice a nice example of how making a market more diffuse creates challenges in market’s social contact. Consider this example: the scarcity of domain names provides the foundation for a lot of spam filtering and as domain names become less scarce those techniques are breaking down. Notice that these registry numbers provide the hook on which reputation hangs. A registrar that retains ownership of the number, and only licenses it’s use, can engage in bait and switch pricing, so I wonder about the recent offer of free domain names from a number of top level registrars. I don’t recall anybody who was aware of that this kind of game was being set up when the original designs for DNS were blocked out. Certainly some people were aware of the risk of having a single point of failure; but that’s just one example of something to be paranoid about.

Actually I don’t think it’s a necessary to have the contest. I think I know what the most expensive registered numbers are: citizen ID numbers. Those in wealthy nations with strong well functioning social contracts and deep pools of public services. A Manhattan phone number is a just proxy for a set of those. Which brings us full circle back to Martian’s posting about phone number values. Should the citizens of Manhattan demand that their phone numbers not be handed out to others; clearly that erodes the value of their numbers?

[[ My current favorite example of a light weight registrar: Linux User Numbers. ]]

BCCI

Sunday, October 24th, 2004

It is an amazement to me that we can be approaching the election and people can fail to know who John Kerry is. I doubt there is much I can do to compensate for that but I might as well try.

Let’s just take an example that’s very relevant to the mess in the Middle East.

BCCI was a bank run out of one of Arab gulf states. The quotes below are from the Senate investigation’s final report on BCCI.

These oil rich gulf states are an organizational pain the neck. When the wealth of a nation flows thru a few very easily controlled bottlenecks it’s almost impossible to avoid extremely severe distributions of wealth. So you get dictators. A handful of men with nothing that can counter act their power; particularly nothing at home. It breeds the worst kinds of societies. Oppression, slavery, prostitution, terrorism, powerful wealthy bad-actors. The typical mess you get when the distribution of wealth becomes so severe that nothing prevents abuse of the little guys while at the top the competition becomes vicious.

And it’s a mess that tends to spread. Because the money and power buys friends and the vicious local culture when exported can find the liberal democratic culture easy prey. BCCI was a perfect example of this kind of spreading cancer.

BCCI’s criminality included fraud by BCCI and BCCI customers involving billions of dollars; money laundering in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas; BCCI’s bribery of officials in most of those locations; support of terrorism, arms trafficking, and the sale of nuclear technologies; management of prostitution; the commission and facilitation of income tax evasion, smuggling, and illegal immigration; illicit purchases of banks and real estate; and a panoply of financial crimes limited only by the imagination of its officers and customers.

Nice people huh?

While BCCI was an ugly mess. But of course such things aren’t hard to find. Here are a few examples: Enron, WorldCom, the California energy debacle, the 80s Savings and Loan mess, the War in Vietnam, the fouled up process of going into Iraq, the apparent institutional breakdown in the days leading up to 9/11, Love Canal, Abu Ghraib, Somilia, Reconstruction after our Civil War.

These are society’s equivalent of natural disasters. They are like a Hurricane sweeping across the Florida pan handle, or the 6 story waves that recently hit the populated coast line of Japan. But these aren’t, entirely, acts of nature and on our good days we learn from these. We toughen up the building codes, we set the buildings back from the shoreline. We remove for the scene those folks who were failed to do the building inspections. We fine the builders that cut corners. We punish those that bribed or took the bribes.

Societies learn. Sometimes one of these comes along and we discover a failure modality that we haven’t seen before - the Asian currency crisis in the 90s was one of these. With luck we figure it out and then lay in regulatory mechanisms - building codes - to temper the risk it will happen again.

Social disasters like these sometimes have bad actors at their core. These actors who labor to overcome society’s defenses.

In 1977, BCCI developed a plan to infiltrate the U.S. market through secretly purchasing U.S. banks while opening branch offices of BCCI throughout the U.S., and eventually merging the institutions. BCCI had
significant difficulties implementing this strategy due to regulatory barriers in the United States designed to insure accountability. Despite these barriers, which delayed BCCI’s entry, BCCI was ultimately successful in acquiring four banks, operating in seven states and the District of Colombia, with no jurisdiction successfully preventing BCCI from infiltrating it.

When these social disasters happen it is very rare for them to go entirely unnoticed. For example the CIA knew what BCCI was up to.

By early 1985, the CIA knew more about BCCI’s goals and intentions concerning the U.S. banking system than anyone else in government, and provided that information to the U.S. Treasury and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, neither of whom had the responsibility for regulating the First American Bank that BCCI had taken over. The CIA failed to provide the critical information it had
gathered to the correct users of the information — the Federal Reserve and the Justice Department.

After the CIA knew that BCCI was as an institution a fundamentally corrupt criminal enterprise, it continued to use both BCCI and First American, BCCI’s secretly held U.S. subsidiary, for CIA operations.

It is also a very common pattern that as these disasters unfold the coordination problems between societies institutions (rivalry for example) frustrate pulling together an appropriate response. For example the various parts of the justice department didn’t seem to be able work together on BCCI.

Justice Department personnel in Washington, Miami and Tampa obstructed and impeded attempts by New York District Attorney Robert Morgenthau to obtain critical information concerning BCCI in 1989, 1990, and 1991, and in one case, a federal prosecutor lied to Morgenthau’s office concerning the existence of such material. Important failures of cooperation continued to take place until William P. Barr became Attorney General in late October, 1991.

Cooperation by the Justice Department with the Federal Reserve was very limited until after BCCI’s global closure on July 5, 1991.

We almost always get to watch the good guys getting confused about what their job is. Acting to assure their local benefit rather than doing their job.

Some public statements by the Justice Department concerning its handling of matters pertaining to BCCI were more cleverly crafted than true.

One way the bad guys manage to pull off something like BCCI is to buy their way into the elite fabric of the societies they are undermining. Much the way the Enron’s Ken Lay was Bush’s largest donor last time around, or the local TV broadcast stations use are so friendly with those who regulate them, or the local savings and loan banks were so friendly with their regulators in the 80s.

BCCI’s systematically relied on relationships with, and as necessary, payments to, prominent political figures in most of the 73 countries in which BCCI operated. BCCI records and testimony from former BCCI officials together document BCCI’s systematic securing of Central Bank deposits of Third World countries; its provision of favors to political figures; and its reliance on those figures to provide BCCI itself with favors in times of need.

The result was that BCCI had relationships that ranged from the
questionable, to the improper, to the fully corrupt with officials
from countries all over the world, including Argentina, Bangladesh,
Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, China, Colombia, the Congo, Ghana,
Guatemala, the Ivory Coast, India, Jamaica, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tunisia, the United Arab
Emirates, the United States, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

While that kind of relationship building is well worth it as the cancer spreads it has a much more serious consequence.

When the disaster finally becomes obvious every one of those partners in crime becomes an ally for a cover up. These are powerful people.

To stand up to that power takes guts.

Who led the Senate investigation on BCCI? John Kerry.

Could there be any experience that makes a man better suited to understanding what is really unfolding in the Middle East?

Do you want a president with that experience?

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Thursday, October 21st, 2004

Thinking about badges and how people reveal their membership in things…


Millitary service ribbons have a rank ordering.

Blog authors announce their affiliation with various vendors, standards, etc.

Boy scouts can wear one of these to reveal their religion, except for Unitarians.

Pins are very popular in the Soviet Union. People collect them.
This power adaptor claims to be very conformant.