Monthly Archives: March 2005

Parade Magazine v.s. Dunbar’s Number

The 31 people on the cover of Parade magazine’s “What People Earn” issue make an average income of 5.8 Million a year. They over sample the elities and under sample the poor.

Meanwhile I want to rant a bit on Dunbar’s number. Dunbar’s number is nicely explained here. The theory goes that you weight the monkey’s noodle and then you plot that versus group sizes you find a correlation. Humans are on the perimeter of this plot (aren’t we?). If you want to play along then our group size is then around a 150. I guess that might work if we were monkeys.

But we aren’t. Language changes the game. It’s a lot easier to solve coordination problems with a bit of language. Technology changes the game. Rolodex, Outlook, oh and the printing press.

Specialization changes the game. In both the business models that give rise to income and the social models that give rise to group structure humans are pretty clever at finding frameworks that enable them to work around limits that might otherwise put a limit on the upper bounds of these things. The distribution of group sizes, the distribution of social contacts, the distribution of wealth do not appear to be capped by physical limitations. My first problem with Dunbar’s number is that it posits the existence of an upper limit when the data doesn’t seem to show any such limit. For example we don’t see any sign that village/city/nation sizes are capped by some limit.

My second problem with Dunbar’s number is that everything seen of it suggests that its fans are uninformed by the power-law distribution in the underlying data. Which means that they aren’t aware of the extremely skew’d distribution of affiliations in real populations.

Dunbar’s number is a measure of social capital. Social capital, like economic capital is not a zero sum game nor is it uniformly distributed. Reasoning by analogy or on the basis of small samples sets is almost always extremely misleading in the presence of highly skew’d distributions.

The bottom 20% of households in the United states captured 3.4% of the total income. Think about that! Should the same distribution holds for affiliations, and I see no reason to think otherwise, that means that one out of five people participate less than 4% of the the benefits generated by the social fabric.

Parade? It misleads you about the elite portions of the social network and the long tail. So does Dunbar’s number. Parade magazine isn’t pretending to be professional, it’s just trying to sell you mattresses, celebrities, and herbal remedies. Dunbar’s number on the other hand is just, well, wrong.

Oasis IPR policy

Eve’s post draws my attention to this argument in support of the Oasis IPR policy.

It would be a good thing if we had a more in depth discussion of what makes for a good IPR policy for a large rambling standards bodies. Lots of polarization on this topic. Pretending that patent pooling isn’t part of the job of a standards body doesn’t fix the problem. Standards bodies need to work to create certainty about about the rules and that includes creating bundles of patent rights.

But, back to the posting. I disagree. It makes two arguments. First is a you pay you play argument and second is this IPR stuff is just like the rest of the negotiation. Too simple. The pay/play argument is the power argument; and that tends to be toxic to collaborative activities. While you can’t eliminate the pay/play arguments in these organizations bringing them into the foreground is usually a sign things are breaking down. That said, the open source community has standing in this discussion. Pretending it doesn’t is silly.

The essay argues that the long term benefit of having meeting the needs of the open source community are less than the short term benefit of attracting various parties to standards negotiation table. But is that really a trade-off that needs to be made? The trade-off: shunning the most likely source of momentum over the long run in exchange for a hypothetical increase in labor in the short run. It’s also rhetorical a balancing act first you have you have to tell one group of people to take a hike. On the other hand you need to argue that leaving the IPR policy structured so each technical committee must guard against IPR traps is actually more inclusive and fair minded. I’m not convinced.

sick

In a fine example of the revenge of the long tail I picked up this virus at Harvard. At a talk on honor and revenge, no less. I’ve been sick for a week!

It’s important when sick not to nurture those negative thought patterns. For example that the principle trigger of bankruptcy is medical events.

While I am on the mend, I’m with Wally!

Firms in Space – Relationship Space

Zooming in on the landscape of the supply chain/graph we can make a very simple model of the firm. The firm has some skills which it plies by drawing inputs from suppliers and creating outputs for it’s customers. For example a lawn mowing business. On the supplier side a few employees, equipment suppliers, insurance, accountant, a bank, maybe a phone. On the customer side maybe a hundred customers. Not too much skill; mostly the skill of keep all these relationships functioning.

A demographer of this landscape might ask about numbers; then we could make plots to reveal patterns. For example consider the number of suppliers v.s. the number of customers. Some firms have huge numbers of customers but very few suppliers. When I was growing up there was a guy in my town who had this huge house on a small mountain; seemed he owned a single patent which he licensed out to companies all over the planet. Almost zero suppliers but millions of customers. Radio stations are another example of this kind.

Then there are firms with huge numbers of suppliers and customers. A fast food restaurant chain for example has lots and lots of employees, real estate deals, local legal & political connections, on the supply side along with numerous customers on the other. Or consider eBay with it’s huge pool of sellers who supply it with goods and it’s huge pool of buyers who receive those goods. Or consider Google with its huge pool of content providers v.s. its pool of eyeballs searching for goods.

How is the population distributed over this two dimensional landscape? That’s actually two questions. Where are firms? where is the money? If we look at firms counts I suspect you find most of the firms are down toward the origin. First world households, for example, typically have maybe a hundred suppliers but they have only small integer number of customers – i.e. most 1st world people are full time employed. If instead of counts, you look at the cash flow I assume you find that much of it is further away from the origin; at least that would be consistent with the distribution of wealth.

See also: design patterns for intermediaries, Ping/Polling, etc.

Is community about place, not really.

Is community really about proximity or place? I don’t think so. Here’s some data.

This shows four flavors of group; bowling, church, political, and neighborhood. Members of neighborhood groups trust each other the least. Bowling provides a stronger way to build community than living in proximity.

That chart is from the book Trust in Society. It’s full of interesting essays. That chart in particular is from an essay by Dietlind Stolle.

Design Patterns for Intermediaries

Between producers and consumers you need to insert some sort of exchange, a trusted intermediary. I’ve always liked the way that people draw this as a cloud. It suggests angels are at work, or possibly that if you look closely things will only get blurry and your glasses will get wet. Even without getting your self wet things aren’t clear even from the outside. For example what do we mean by trust? Does it mean low-latency, reliability, robust governance, low barriers to entry, competitive markets, minimal concentration of power – who knows?

There are some leading design patterns for working on these problems. Sometimes the cloud condenses into a single hub. For example one technique is to introduce a central hub, or a monopoly. The US Postal system, the Federal Reserve’s check clearing houses, AT&T’s long distance business are old examples of that. Of course none of those were ever absolute monopolies; you could always find examples of some amount of exchange that took place by going around the hub – if you want to split hairs. Google in ‘findablity’, eBay in auctions, Amazon in the online book business are more modern examples.

In the blog update notification space the hub originally was weblogs.com, but for a number of reasons it didn’t retain that role. Today the cloud’s structure is kind of lumpy. There are lumps on the producer side and the consumer side. On the producing side all the majors have aggregated a supply of pings; for example Typepad presumably has a huge supply of pings, WordPress comes out of the box pinging Ping-o-matic. On the consuming side big players aggregate pings as well, some of these are evolving toward or are explicitly in the role of intermediaries. The blog search sites are a good example (Pubsub, Feedster, Technorati). They all labor to discover fresh content. The trends seems to be toward condensation. Industries in this situation often, given time, create some sort of federated approach.

Federated approachs are clearly more social than hubs. In markets where the participants are naturally noncompetitive they can be quite social. For example when national phone companies federate to exchange traffic, or small banks federate to clear checks or credit card payments. That can change over time, of course. The nice feature of a federated architecture is that it helps create clarity about where the rules of the game are being blocked out. How and who rules the cloud is part of the mystery of trust.

There is a third school of design for the cloud, what might be called “look mom no hands” or maybe technology magic. The first time I encountered that one was the routing algorithms for the Arpanet; but that’s another story. These techniques go by various names; just to pick a few P2P, distributed hashing, multicast. The general idea for these is that the N participants all install a clever lump of code; these clever bits then collaborate (using elegant ideas) and a routing network emerges that makes the problem go away.

The magic based solutions have great stories or illustrations to go with them. For example the early Arpanet architecture had each node in the net act advertise it’s service to it’s neighbors who would then shop for the best route – boy did that not work! I worked on on three multiprocessors in the 1970s that had varing designs for how to route data between CPU and memory. One of these, the Butterfly, had a switched who’s topology was based on the Fast Fourier Transform.


Recently I’ve been reading some papers about a system that uses what you might call fountain routing. All the nodes are arranged as peers around a circle. Packets bounce thru a few nodes to get where they are going. Each node has a few paths to distant parts of the circle and more paths to it’s neighbors. The illustration shows one node’s routes. A packet entering at that node would get thrown toward a node closer to it’s destination that node will have more routes to even closer nodes.

The monopoly/hub designs are social only to the extent that a monarchy a social structure. The federated designs are social in the manner of a town meeting or the roman senate. The technical magic solutions are social in the sense the sense that they take as a given that everybody will sign up to the same standard social contract. Each of these social architectures has it’s blind spots. For example the federated design can easily lock out small players because they can’t get a seat at the table. Magic technical solutions seem to break down when the traffic patterns stop behaving what ever their designers presumed. E.g. as the blogging example demonstrates the real world is rarely high trusting, random, uniform, collaborative, and peer to peer.

Ping/Poll why they don’t scale

Off an on for the last few months I’ve been playing with the problem of how web sites notify their reader producers-exchange-consumerswhen they have fresh content. This is sometimes called the Ping problem. Sometimes it’s called push, to contrast it with the typical way that content is discovered on the net i.e. pulling it from it’s source. The problem interests me for an assortment of reasons, not the least of which is that it’s a two sided network effect. On the one side you have writers and on the other side you have readers. I draw a drawing like the one on the right for situations like that. Two fluffy clouds for the producers and the consumers connected thru some sort of exchange.

The design problem that I find fascinating is the exchange. For example you could build a single hub, or a peer to peer system, or possibly something based on standards. Lots of choices both technical, social, and economic.

The set of producers has some very exceptional members. For example if you limit the problem to just blogs then Blogger and Typepad together probably account for a huge slice of the pie. Similarly some consumers have a huge appetite for content. Google, Technorati, Feedster, etc. want to read everything! These two populations are skewed, i.e. their power-laws. I draw a picture like this to illustrate that.

The blogging example provides a nice case study for the more general problem. In that community we currently have two standard solutions to the problem. Both don’t scale. Ping, which let’s producers notify a handful of sites when they update, was originally designed to notify a single site (and now a handful of sites) of updates. While it serves the voracious readers well it doesn’t scale up to help the rest of the readers. So the rest of the readers use polling to check if sites have changed. It’s a curious counter point that polling is a pain in the neck for the elite producers; in effect it enlists the long tail of readers into a denial of service attack on them.
Illustration showing how Ping serves high-volume consumers while poll stresses high volume producers.

While it’s not hard to construct conspiracy theories when working on problems like this, it is also foolish to ignore that powerful winner take all games are in the room. The shape of the distributions creates that high stakes game. It’s critical that the design take the distributions and traffic patterns into account. The Ping/Poll design is that it’s elites on the consuming side benefit while the elites on the producer side suffer. I’d be amazed if that was intentional!

Fascinating problem.

Loser! Try again!

Certainly in the top ten way to manage a group boundary is having an exam. The exam is good if the owner/governors of the group want fine control over the group membrane. The primary problem with an exam is it tends to make your group a monoculture and not surprisingly that monoculture’s primary attribute is skill at exam taking. That displaces practical skills. Pretty soon the folks in charge of the group start thinking that exams are the hammer for every nail and the groups most complementary group is something like Kaplan’s test prep company.

I heard tell of an exam for set designers that involves locking them in a large building containing a stage and a lot of materials and then coming back later and seeing what they came up with. I like that. Presumably that too has unintended consequences. Wouldn’t it be better if they filled the building with difficult producers, stage managers, investors, suppliers, etc.?

Professions societies get stuck in a tough bind when they go to design the next revision of their entrance exams. On the one hand they want to use it to raise professional standards and assure quality. If they can do that then they and their clients know that people in the group can be trusted. Trust is extremely valuable since it creates efficiency.

On the other hand they want to manage the supply of professionals because that directly effects what they can charge. Make the test harder the supply goes down and your prices go up.

Doesn’t matter who manages the test you still have to worry thru both the agency problems and the question of what exactly your goals really are. In this country we have laws that preclude “company unions,” i.e. unions who’s governance power is held by the firm’s management. That’s an obvious setup for abuse.

So I was amused to see that Microsoft is currently offering free retests for Microsoft certified engineers. My first reaction was that they were attempting to increase the supply; i.e. lower prices. Then I got to thinking about how “company unions” are illegal “company defined professions” aren’t.

Charging the Customer

My bank as recently decided they will charge an annual fee for the overdraft protection feature on my checking account. In the current low interest climate it’s been very very hard for banks to make a profit on their deposits sufficient to cover their costs. That has forced them into the uncomfortable position of having to raise fees. Their marketing departments have been very clever, and I don’t mean that in a nice way, about finding means to do that while avoiding being straight forward about it.

So it was with some interest that I read that the credit card industry captured an 18% increase in fees last year. You’d think that an industry that is, oh, 10 thousand years old and right in the sweet spot of our productivity improvements wouldn’t be growing like that. But what with deregulation it looks like usury is making quite the come back.

There is kind of a stack of points in the relationship with a customer where a firm spends and makes money. Looks something like this:

  • Exceptional events, like an overdraft.
  • Typcial transactions, deposits, check cashing, etc.
  • Account Maintainance
  • Account Setup or “Provisioning”
  • Customer Acquisition, aka sales.
  • Market Development

The firm can play lots of games with were in this stack it make v.s. spends money.

Some of the games played here are really obnoxious. I keep getting letters from one of my credit card companies that offers me %1.9 percent on balance transfers, but deep in the fine print it says that if I ever have an exceptional event the interest rate then goes to 29.8%. Included in the suite of exceptional events is any late payment.

It’s an interesting counter point to the discriminatory pricing games. There the seller would like to get a better model of your willingness to pay. In these pricing games the seller wants to create a haze of obscure pricing structure which makes it impossible for you to perceive what the price really is. Privacy is a two way street in all the negotiations.

One weird side effect of all this is that as the firms have begun to play this game better they have started to play a particular game that somebody who’s time is worthless can play to their benefit. The firm works to make a profit over all N layers in that stack. It is often willing to forgo revenue in the lower layers that it believes it will make up in the upper ones.

For example the cell phone companies bribe you to sign up, with a free phone for example, and then make the money back on the monthly fees and “exceptional” transactions. They also lock you in with n-year contracts.

If your not locked-in then your almost certainly able to benefit from being disloyal and regularly switching vendors. For example it’s very common for credit card vendors to offer short term cash back deals. 5% off all purchase for 2 months for example. Presumably if you switch cards ever few months you can maintain that cash back rate.

I wonder if they have worked out some way to damage your credit rating if you do that consistently.